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The economic collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites throughout
Central and East Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s spawned
experimentation with a democratic government that swept across the vast
geography of the former superpower and its East block buffer states, with an
energy and optimism unrivaled in modem political history. The odds were
overwhelming, rooted in dysfunctional economic systems and a character
groomed by paternalism that frowned on individual initiative and fostered a
perverse dependence on criminally repressive1 totalitarian regimes for such
fundamental needs as housing, employment, and subsistence. Yet, courageous
men and women envisioned the demise of the state and declining party control as
an unprecedented opportunity to structure new political institutions. Patterned
after their neighbors to the west, their efforts culminated in the formation of
fledgling independent and democratically oriented governments in many of the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the new independent states.
A seminal hallmark of these new parliamentary democracies was the drafting of
* Chief, Court Management, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The
Hague, Netherlands and international judicial systems consultant; former District Court
Clerk/Court Executive, United States District Court for the District of Utah and senior staff
member, the Federal Judicial Center; B.A., M.A. University of Utah; Ed.M., Ed.D. Harvard
University.
1. See STt-PHANE COURTOIS, ET AL., THE BLACK BOOK OF COMMUNISM (1999) (for an
exhaustive chronicle of terror and atrocity perpetrated to advance the political ideology of
Communism).
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constitutions that established and legitimized experimentation with democratic
reform. The new constitutions outline governments that are organized by
function, and distinguished by the manner in which authority is apportioned
among those functions to achieve a separation of powers. A primary functional
component of each of these new governments is a judiciary.2
Under the constitutions or laws and statutes issued under the constitutional
umbrellas, the judiciary was to be organized and maintained independently. 3
2. E.g., see generally infra note 3. Although the governments of the countries under
discussion typically feature a constitutional court, such courts exist independently and fall outside
the jurisdiction of the judicial branch. To that extent, they are not included in this discussion.
3. ALB. CONST. art. 145 (Adopted on August 4, 1998; states that "Judges are independent and
subject only to the Constitution and the laws." To underscore that independence, § 3 adds that
"Interference in the activity of the courts or the judges entails liability according to law."); BELR.
CONST. art. 6 (Adopted on March 1, 1994; ordains that the State shall rely on the principle of
dividing power into legislative, executive, and judicial power. State bodies, within the limits of
their powers, shall be independent. They shall cooperate among themselves and check and
counterbalance one another. Chapter 6, art. 110, § 1 states that "In administering justice judges
shall be independent and subordinate only to the law."); BULG. CONST. art. 117 (Adopted on July
12, 1991; provides that "Judicial power is independent."); CHECHNYA CONST. art. 94 (Adopted on
March 12, 1992; provides that the judicial power in Chechen Republic is executed only by court
and acts irrespective of legislative, executive authority as well as of parties, other public
unifications and movements. Nobody, except for bodies of justice stipulated by the Constitution
and laws of Chechen Republic, have the right to incur functions and authorities of judicial power.
Article 97 provides that judges are independent and subordinated only to the law. CROAT. CONST.
art. 4 (Adopted in December 1990; specifies that the government "[S]hall be organized on the
principle of separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial branches." Article 117
specifies that "Judicial power shall be autonomous and independent." t"STAVA CR [Constitution]
art. 2 (Czech Rep.), (Adopted on December 10, 1992; declares that "All state power derives from
the people; they exercise this power by means of their legislative, executive, and judicial bodies."
Article 81 provides that "Judicial power is exercised by independent courts on behalf of the
Republic." Article 82 states further that "Judges are independent in the execution of their
function."); EST. CONST. art. 4 (Adopted on June 28, 1992; prescribes that "The work of the
Parliament, the President of the Republic, the Government of the Republic, and the Courts shall be
organized on the principle of separate and balanced powers." Article 146 specifies that "The
Courts shall be independent in their work and shall administer justice in accordance with the
Constitution and laws."); A MAGYAR KOzTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 50 (Hung.)
(Adopted on August 20, 1949 and subsequently amended; provides that "Judges are independent
and subordinate only to the law."); LAT. CONST. art. 83 (Adopted on February 15, 1922; article 83
ordains that "Judges shall be independent and subject only to the law."); LITH. CONST. art. 5
(Adopted on October 25, 1992; provides that "In Lithuania, the powers of the State shall be
exercised by the Seimas, the President of the Republic and Government, and the Judiciary."
Article 109 ordains that "While administering justice, judges, and courts shall be independent.");
MACED. CONST. art. 98 (Adopted on November 17, 1991; states that "Judiciary power is exercised
by courts. Courts are autonomous and independent."); POL. CONST. art. 10 (Adopted on April 2,
1997; provides that "The system of government of the Republic of Poland shall be based on the
separation of and balance between the legislative, executive, and judicial powers." Article 10
allocates legislative power to the House of Representatives (Sejm) and the Senate, executive power
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However, precisely what this independence entails is left unstated to varying
degrees.4  Some specify that once judges are appointed, they serve unlimited
terms or are guaranteed tenure until a certain age.5  Others ordain that once
to the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers, and judicial power to the courts and
tribunals. Article 173 identifies the judiciary as a "separate power" that "shall be independent of
other branches of power." Article 178 ordains that "Judges, within the exercise of their office,
shall be independent and subject only to the Constitution and statutes." The body within the
Judicial Branch that is charged to "safeguard the independence of courts and judges" in art. 186 of
the Constitution is the National Council of the Judiciary.); ROM. CONST. art. 123 (Adopted on
December 8, 1991; provides that "Judges shall be independent and subject only to the law.");
KONSTITUTSIA RosSlSKO1 FEDERATSII [KONST. RF][Constitution] art. 10 (Russ.) (Adopted on
December 12, 1993; provides that "State power in the Russian Federation is exercised on the basis
of the separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches. The bodies of legislative,
executive, and judiciary powers are independent." Article 120 provides that "Judges are
independent and obey only the Constitution and the federal law."); SLOVK. CONST. art. 141
(Adopted on September 1, 1992; provides that "The judiciary shall be administered by independent
and impartial courts of the Slovak Republic." Section 2 provides that "The judiciary shall be
independent of other branches of government at all levels." Article 144 ordains that "Judges shall
be independent and bound only by law."); SLOVN. CONST. art. 3 (Adopted on December 23, 1991;
provides that "In Slovenia, power is vested in the people. Citizens exercise this power directly and
through elections, consistent with the principle of separation of legislative, executive, and judicial
powers." Article 125 provides that "Judges shall be independent in the performance of the judicial
function. They shall be bound by the Constitution and laws.").
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (The same characterization applies to the U.S. Constitution which,
while guaranteeing judicial tenure during good behavior and undiminished judicial compensation
while in office, details neither how the federal judiciary is to be governed nor its independence
preserved vis- -vis the political branches. It does, however, prescribe specific powers by which
the judiciary oversees certain executive and legislative functions in the interests of preserving the
supremacy of the Constitution and the sovereignty of the people).
5. ALB. CONST. art. 138 ("The time a judge stays on duty cannot be limited ...."), art. 139, §
I (c) ("The term of a High Court judge ends when he... reaches the age of 65 ...."); BULG.
CONST. art. 129, § 3 (providing that judicial officers, after completing five years in office, will be
dismissed from their position only upon retirement, resignation, conviction of a criminal offense,
disability that extends for more than a year and renders them incapable of performing their
functions, or "serious violation or systematic non-fulfillment of their official duties as well as
actions that damage the prestige of the judicial power."); CROAT. CONST. art. 122 (stating that
"[t]he judicial office is permanent."); U"STAVA CR [Constitution] art. 93, § 1 (Czech Rep.) ("A
judge is appointed to office by the President of the Republic without a time limit."); EST. CONST.
art. 147 (providing that "j]udges shall be appointed for life."); LAT. CONST. art. 84 ("The
appointment of judges shall be confirmed by the Saeima and they may not be dismissed. Judges
may be dismissed from office against their will only by the Saeima and in the cases prescribed by
law, following a decision taken by the Disciplinary Commission of Judges or a court judgment in a
criminal matter."); MACED. CONST. art. 99 ("A judge is appointed without restriction on the
duration of his/her term of office."); POL. CONST. art. 179 (ordaining that "[jiudges are appointed
for an indefinite period by the President of the Republic on the motion of the National Council of
the Judiciary."), art. 180, § 1 (providing that "[j]udges are not irremovable."); ROM. CONST. art.
125, § 1 ("Judges appointed by the President of Romania shall be irremovable in accordance with
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judges are appointed, they must disassociate themselves from previous
affiliations with partisan political parties and related organizations, and further,
refrain from participation in political activities. 6 Some prohibit any effort on the
part of others -whether family, friends, professional colleagues, or government
officials-to influence or to attempt to influence how judges will rule. 7 Others
go so far as to provide immunity for judges from civil suits for monetary damage
resulting from improper acts or omissions undertaken in their professional
capacity. Some provide that judges charged with criminal activities may be
law."); KONSTITUTSIIA RossIISKoI FEDERATSII [Konst. RF][Constitution] art. 121, §§ 1-2 (Russ.)
(stating that "[j]udges are irremovable[,]" and that a judge's power can neither be terminated nor
suspended except as provided for under federal law); SLOVK. CONST. art. 145, § I ("The judges are
appointed and recalled by the President of the Slovak Republic on the proposal of the Judicial
Council of the Slovak Republic; he appoints them without time limits."), art. 154, § 4 ("The judges
of the courts of the Slovak Republic, appointed to their functions according to then prevailing legal
regulations, are considered appointed to their functions without time limits according to this
Constitution."); SLOVN. CONST. art. 129 (ordaining that "[t]he office of a judge is permanent.").
6. ALB. CONST. art. 143 ("Being a judge is not compatible with any other State, political or
private activity."); CHECHNYA COMMENTARY & CONSTITUTION art. 97 (prohibiting judges from
membership in political parties); EST. CONST. art. 147 ("Judges may not hold any other elected or
appointed office, except in the cases prescribed by law."); A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG
ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 50 (Hung.) ("Judges may not hold membership in any party and
must not carry on political activities."); LITH. CONST. art. 113 (stating that judges can not hold
elected or appointed posts, and can not engage in activities of political parties and organizations);
MACED. CONST. art. 100 ("The judge's office is incompatible with other public office, profession
or membership of a political party."); POL. CONST. art. 178, § 3 ("A judge shall not belong to a
political party, a trade union or perform public activities incompatible with the principles of
independence of the courts and judges."); ROM. CONST. art. 125, § 3 ("The position of judge is
incompatible with any other public or private office, with the exception of teaching positions in
higher education."); YUGO. CONST. art. 109 ("A justice of the Federal Court may not hold any
other public office or engage in any other professional activity .... ); SLOVN. CONST. § 133 ("The
judicial office is incompatible with functions in other state organs, in local self-government organs
and in organs of political parties, and with other offices and activities specified by law.").
7. IJSTAVA OR [Constitution] art. 82, § I (Czech Rep.) (stating that "[judges'] impartiality
must not be endangered by anyone."); BELR. CONST. art. 110 ("Any interference in the activities of
the administration of justice is impermissible and liable to legal action."); LrrI. CONST. art. 114
"[C]itizens shall be prohibited from interfering with the activities of a judge or the court, and
violation of this shall incur liability.").
8. BuLG. CONST. art. 132, §§ 1-2 ("While exercising judicial power, judges, procurators, and
investigators do not bear criminal and civil responsibility for their official actions and acts enacted
by them unless they are committed as an international crime of a general character. In [the cases
just described], charges cannot be brought against a judge, procurator, and investigator without the
approval of the Supreme Judicial Council."); CROAT. CONST. art. 121 ("Judges enjoy immunity in
accordance with the law."); LITH. CONST. art. 114 ("Judges may not have legal actions instituted
against them, nor may they be arrested or restricted of personal freedom without the consent of the
Seimas, or in the period between sessions of the Seimas, of the President of the Republic of
Lithuania."); MACED. CONST. art. 100 (stating that "[j]udges enjoy immunity."); KONSTITUTSIIA
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
prosecuted only after certain sectors of the government have granted their
approval. 9  Still others provide that judges must abide by a judicial code of
conduct and further state that those in violation of the judicial code of conduct
are subject to appropriate disciplinary measures, as determined by an
• 10
independent review process. Some prohibit judges from engaging in legal and
other forms of professional activity for which they receive compensation.'
1
Finally, others are modeled after the U.S. Constitution and prohibit reduced
compensation while in office. 12  Each of these fledgling governments have
attempted to craft constitutional provisions designed with the ultimate goal of
promoting judicial independence and to protecting judges from undue external
influence.
Some of the less obvious indicia of judicial independence, equally critical
but often neglected in constitutional language about the adjudicative functions of
government, 13 have to do with the manner in which judicial systems are
RossuISKOI FEDERATSII [Konst. RF][Constitution] art. 122, § I (Russ.) (ordaining that "[j]udges
possess immunity."); YUGO. CONST. art. 109 ("A justice of the Federal Court shall enjoy the same
immunity as a federal deputy."); SLOVN. CONST. art. 134 ("No one who participates in the making
of judicial decisions may be held accountable for an opinion expressed during decision-making in
court.").
9. ALB. CONST. art. 137, § 1 ("A judge of the High Court may be criminally prosecuted only
with the approval of the Assembly."); EST. CONST. art. 153 ("A judge may be charged with a
criminal offence during his or her term of office only on proposal by the National Court and with
the consent of the President of the Republic."); POL. CONST. art. 181 ("A judge cannot, without
prior consent granted by a court specified by law, be held criminally responsible nor deprived of
freedom."); SLOVN. CONST. art. 134 ("If a judge is suspected of a criminal offence in the
performance of the judicial office, he may not be detained nor may criminal proceedings be
initiated against him without the consent of the State Assembly.").
10. MACED. CONST. art. 99 ("A judge is discharged.., as a consequence of unprofessional and
unethical performance of the judge's office, upon a decision of the Judicial Council of The
Republic in a procedure regulated by law.").
11. ALB. CONST. art. 143 ("Being a judge is not compatible with any other.., private
activity."); BEL. CONST. art. 111 ("Judges may not engage in business activities or perform any
[other] paid work, apart from teaching and scientific research."); CHECHNYA CONST. art. 97
("Judges may not occupy any other paid position, with the exception of educational work .... );
LITH. CONST. art. 113 ("Judges... may not be employed in any business, commercial, or other
private institution or company. They are also not permitted to receive any remuneration other than
the salary established for judges as well as payments for educational, scientific, or creative
activities.").
12. Compare ALB. CONST. art. 138 (prohibits the lowering of judicial pay or related benefits
while in office.), with POL. CONST. ("Judges shall be provided with appropriate conditions for work
and granted remuneration consistent with the dignity of their office and scope of their duties.").
13. See generally U.S. CONST.; see also 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
(Max Farrand, ed., 2d ed. 1937) (explaining that those who authored and ratified the Constitution
of the United States provided for a judiciary with express powers of government, but included
neither guidance nor direction as to how the judiciary was to be governed or administered).
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governed and the institutional context in which they operate. Questions that
probe for constraints on judicial independence in this institutional context
include:
" to what extent do agencies affiliated with the political branches of the
government participate in the oversight or governance of the judiciary;
" are the functions and objectives of those political branch agencies
compatible with those of the judiciary;
" are there areas in which their respective functions and objectives compete
or collide with each other;
" do those political branch agencies exercise controls over the judiciary in
ways that affect or have the potential to compromise judicial
independence;
" is the organization and operational viability of the judiciary subject to
review and manipulation by those agencies in any way; and
" does the manner in which those agencies interact with the judiciary have
the potential to compromise how the judiciary should conduct its business
and exercise its authority?
Some constitutions reflect broad institutional concerns. The Constitution of
the United States, formally ratified in 1788, establishes three divisions of
government to be headed, respectively, by a Congress, a President, and a
Supreme Court. Although the language does not formally pronounce the
aforementioned branches of the U.S. government as separate and independent
from each other, it does grant to each of them appropriate responsibility and
power. Moreover, the U.S. Constitution also imposes constraints on the exercise
of power of each branch through the authority that it vests in the other two. The
U.S. Constitution has become an enduring model for other nations pursuing a
more functional, accountable, and representative form of government. For
example, the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, enacted more than two
centuries later, provides for a system of government based on the separation and
balance of powers among the three branches. 14 The Constitutions of Belarus,
Croatia, Russia, and Slovenia also reference separation of Fpowers into the
legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government. Similarly, the
Bulgarian Constitution provides that the power of the state shall be divided
between three branches.
16
14. See POL. CONST. art. 10.
15. See BELR. CONST. art. 6; CROAT. CONST. art. 4; KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII
[KONST. RF][CONSTITUTION] art 10 (Russ.); SLOVN. CONST. art.3.
16. See BULG. CONST. art. 8.
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The separation of powers doctrine first emerged as a fundamental principle
of the foundation for a democratic government, and more recently, for an
independent judiciary. As evidenced by the constitutions of several Central and
East European countries cited above, the separation of powers doctrine is
routinely invoked in constitutional language. However, judicial independence is
not guaranteed simply by what is set forth in a constitution. There are other
important institutional elements that work in tandem with constitutional
provisions to guarantee judicial independence. Among these are:
" a mutual and professional respect on the part of officials in each branch
of government for their counterparts in the other branches;
" a strong, active, well-educated, and independent bar whose members
subscribe to ethical principles of professional responsibility and the rule
of law;
" university law faculties that provide a rigorous and thorough education in
the fundamentals and principles of the law, the legal system, and the rule
of law;
* an understanding by the political branches of the government that
unpopular judicial decisions must not only be tolerated, but respected and
enforced;
" a source of comprehensive, permanent, and uncompromised jurisdiction,
trial and appellate, over conflicts and violations that arise in the context
of the constitution, laws, and regulations of the state;
" court proceedings that are open to the public; that are governed by fair,
accessible, and consistently applied rules, procedures, and law; and to
which all citizens have equal access;
* a non-partisan and objective selection process that appoints men and
women of high moral character, intelligence, experience, and
understanding to positions as judges;
" judicial immunity from lawsuits brought by dissatisfied litigants and
personal protection from violence and other acts of revenge and hatred;
" a self-governing framework by means of which the judiciary can define,
advocate, control, and administer its financial and other needs.
Although all of these elements are critical to any discussion of judicial
independence, this discussion focuses on the last one-a self-governing
framework by means of which the judiciary can define, advocate, control, and
administer its financial and other needs.
17. See generally 1-4 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand, ed.,
2d ed. 1937) (referencing the separation of powers argument in the debates among the framers).
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The judiciary provisions of the constitutions of many democratic
governments in Europe, and that of the United States, are either largely silent as
to how the judicial branch should be governed or provide for an oversight body
and specify in broad terms what its functions are. The issue is a delicate one.
Judges who carefully consider the range of issues that define the concept of
judicial independence traditionally shun efforts to impose any form of non-
judicial institutional control over how they operate, even if such controls appear
to have nothing to do with the exercise of their judicial powers. Their aversion
notwithstanding, the determination of how the judiciary as an institution is to be
governed typically lies with the legislative arm. In the United States, as is
detailed below, each stage in the progressive 200-plus-year evolution of the
federal judiciary's internal governing structure was advanced by legislative
initiative.19
The early development of governance structures in many of the new
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the new independent states have
followed a continental model that, while proclaiming the independence of the
20judiciary, provide for a substantial role by the minister of justice, an appointed
18. ALB. CONST. art. 147, §§ 1, 2, 4, 6 (providing for a High Council of Justice in section 1 that
is chaired by the President of the Republic as indicated by section 2 and whose functions include
judicial discipline and, when warranted, removal of judges from office in sections 4 and 6); BULG.
CONST. art. 130, 131-133 (authorizing a Supreme Judicial Council in article 130 and setting forth
its functions in article 131-133); CROAT. CONST. art. 123 (providing for a State Judicial Council);
A MAGYAR KOZTA&RSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 50, § 4 (Hung.) (briefly referencing
the National Judiciary Council which administers the Hungarian Judiciary); LrrH. CONST. art. 112,
§ 5 ("A special institution of judges provided by law shall submit recommendations to the
President concerning the appointment of judges, as well as their promotion, transference, or
dismissal from office."); MACED. CONST. art. 105 (listing eight functions of the Judicial Council of
the Republic relating to such topics as elections, discipline, and discharge of judges); POL. CONST.
art. 179 (providing for a National Council of the judiciary to move the appointment by the
President of the Republic of judges to the Polish courts); id. at art. 186, §§ 1, 2 ("[S]afeguard[ing]
the independence of the courts and judges... mak[ing] application to the Constitutional Tribunal
regarding the conformity to the Constitution of normative acts to the extent to which they relate to
the independence of courts and judges."); ROM. CONST. art. 133, 134 (providing for a High Council
of the Judiciary whose functions are to nominate judges and public prosecutors for approval by the
President of Romania as well as providing disciplinary functions); SLOVN. CONST. art. 130-32
(providing for a Judicial Council which recommends judicial nominees to the State Assembly and
proposes dismissal of judges, to the State Assembly who violate the law or abuse their judicial
office).
19. That is not to suggest, however, that high level judicial branch officials as well as leaders of
prominent bar associations and influential legal scholars did not exercise their prerogative to
stimulate such legislative initiatives and influence the direction they took. Powerful Chief Justices,
such as Taft, Hughes, and Warren prompted, shaped, and ensured passage of important enabling
legislation that defined and empowered the institutional independence of the Judicial Branch.
20. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 97 (F.R.G.) ("Judges are independent and subject
only to the law."); but see 1958 CONST. 64 (Fr.) ("The President of the Republic is the guarantor of
[Vol. 14:1
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executive branch official, in the apointment of candidates for judicial office and
in administration of the courts. Moreover, either in their constitutions or in
follow-up legislation that addresses the minutia of judicial branch governance,
many of these fledgling democracies, mimicking this continental model, provide
for administrative management and oversight of the judiciary by the minister of
justice or by a high-level national council member. These councils variously
comprise members of the judicial, legislative, and executive branches,
2 2
prominent attorneys and professors of law, and of which the justice minister is a
prominent member, may exercise significant authority over judicial branch
affairs.
23
the independence of the judicial authority."); id. (showing the President is assisted by the High
Council of the Judiciary).
21. 1958 CONST. 65 (Fr.) ("The High Council of the Judiciary is presided over by the President
of the Republic. The Minster of Justice is its vice-president ex-officio. He may stand in (Il peut
supplier) for the President of the Republic. [Furthermore,] [t]he section of the High Council of the
Judiciary with jurisdiction for judges makes nominations for the appointment of judges in the
Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation), the first presidents of the court of appeal and the
presidents of the superior court (tribunal de grande instance). Other judges shall be appointed
with its assent."); GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 95, § 2 (F.R.G.) ("The judges of each of
[the Supreme Courts of the Federation] are chosen jointly by the competent Federal Minister
[presumably justice] and a committee for the selection of judges consisting of the competent Land
ministers and an equal number of members elected by the Bundestag."); id. at art. 98, § 4
("[Applying this to the states,] [t]he Lander may provide that Land judges shall be chosen jointly
by the Land Minister of Justice and a committee for the selection of judges."); COST. art. 105
(Italy) ("The High Council of the Judiciary, in accordance with the regulations of the judiciary, has
jurisdiction for the appointments, assignments and transfers, promotions and disciplinary measures
of judges."); id. at art. 104 ("The High Council of the Judiciary is presided over by the President of
the Republic. Members by right are the first president and the procurator general of the Court of
Cassation."); id. at art. 110 ("Without prejudice to the competence of the High Council of the
Judiciary, the Minister of Justice has responsibility for the organization and functioning of the
services concerned with justice.").
22. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 13, at 21 (during the
debate among the framers of the United States Constitution during the Federal Convention of 1787
included a resolution by Virginia delegate Edmund Randolph for a similarly constituted council of
high-level representatives from more than one branch); id. ("[His council of revision would be
comprised of] the Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary ... to examine
every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate.., and that the dissent of the said
Council shall amount to a rejection .. "). Had it been approved, this council would have
exercised the equivalent of a veto power over the Legislative Branch's initiatives by, among
others, Judicial Branch officials. The framers declined to accept it.
23. ALB. CONST. art. 147, § 1 (explaining that the membership of the Albanian High Council of
Justice includes the Minister of Justice); id. at art. 147, §§ 4, 6 (demonstrating that the High
Council disciplines and transfers judges); id. at art. 137, § 3 (showing that the Council also
approves the criminal prosecution of judges of all courts except the High Court); BULG. CONST. art.
130, § 5 (explaining that the Bulgarian Supreme Judicial Council is chaired by the Minister of
Justice in a non-voting capacity); id. at § 1 (noting that the members include the government's
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Judges in many of these countries, unlike their more resigned judicial
colleagues in Western European countries, 24 are struggling with the issue of how
to divorce their court systems from the oversight and administrative control
exercised by ministerial government officials, and how to transfer those controls
to their respective judiciaries. They should not be discouraged if the resolution
of those issues seems glacial, frustrating, and hopeless. In the United States, the
federal judiciary's efforts to wrest administrative governance from the executive,
to secure legislative confidence, and finally to achieve institutional independence
began with relatively innocuous initiatives. It was a protracted process that
slowly gathered steam in an erratic but progressive stream of events. In fact, it
consumed more than two hundred years. A brief review of those efforts is
instructive.
II. INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE U.S. JUDICIARY
We begin with the ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1788. 25 Section I
of Article III authorizes the Congress to establish a Supreme Court and "such
inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish." 26
Apart from that authority, the Constitution provides no additional guidance.
Cognizant of the need to develop an organizational framework for these inferior
Chief Procurator); CROAT. CONST. art. 121 (showing that the State Judicial Council is tasked with
judicial discipline); id. at art. 123 ("[The members of the State Judicial Council] are chosen by the
Croatian Sabor in a manner specified by the Constitution and law, among renowned judges,
lawyers and university law professors."); A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMNYA [Constitution]
art. 50, § 4 (Hung.) (noting that the National Council on Administration of Justice is tasked with
administering the courts); (The Council's membership, as specified by law, includes ten judges but
also includes the President of the Hungarian Bar Association, two members of Parliament
representing the Legislative Branch, and the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General
representing the Executive Branch); POL. CONST. art. 186, § 1 ("[Poland's] National Council of the
Judiciary shall safeguard the independence of courts and judges."); id. at art. 179 (noting that
another function includes proposing candidates for judicial appointment); id. at art. 187, § 1
(explaining that membership on the National Council of the Judiciary includes, in addition to 15
judges, four members of the Sejm, two members of the Senate, and the Minister of Justice).
24. By contrast, their judicial counterparts in Western European countries whose judiciaries
continue to varying degrees to be administered and overseen by justice or equivalent government
ministries appear to have reached a comfort level with that structure that, in their view, neither
threatens nor prejudices their individual independence as judges.
25. See Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 671
(1980) (providing a summary narrative of historical developments that spawned and elaborated the
concept of judicial independence in enlightenment England and the American colonies,
developments crucial to the persuasions that culminated in the constraints on executive and
legislative interference in the exercise of judicial power set forth in Article III of the U.S.
Constitution).
26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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courts, in 1789 the U.S. Congress passed, and President George Washington
signed into law, "An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States."
27
In this legislation, Congress established the first iteration of a system of federal
district courts, apart from the courts of the several states, and created a basic
organizational framework for that system. In subsequent legislation directed
toward the administration of the courts, Congress passed a variety of acts
addressing everything from the daily compensation of the clerk of the Supreme
Court for a day spent in court to what the marshal should be paid for summoning
grand and petit juries;28 from specifying the form and process for writs and
executions to requiring unsuccessful defendants in forfeiture cases to pay
costs;2 9 from specifications regarding the taking of bail in criminal matters to
authorizing the federal courts to "make rules and orders for their respective
courts" in certain matters of process; 30 and from specifying the dollar threshold,
exclusive of costs, necessary to appeal a case to the appropriate circuit court31 to
authorizing the clerk of the District of Louisiana to appoint a deputy.
32
The next major legislative milestone affecting the structural framework of
the federal judiciary was not enacted until more than one hundred years later.
The 1891 Court of Appeals Act empowered the federal judiciary to more
effectively deal with the judicial business of a country encountering rapid
population growth, political sophistication, and unprecedented geographic
expansion. Among its provisions, the Act established a new level of appeals or
second-instance judgeship and a new tribunal or court with clearly defined
intermediate appellate jurisdiction.
However, the growth of the judicial branch was missing a self-governing
administrative structure. Administrative authority was exercised locally by
individual judges very loosely. Although the judges were experts in applying the
law, they frequently had little or no expertise in management and administration,
and operated largely independent of any central administrative controls. There
were few national policies, guidelines, or regulations governing the procedural
operations and administration of the courts. Initially, the Department of the
Treasury oversaw the fiscal administration of the lower courts. However, as the
role of the federal government expanded and as Congress increased the number
and diversity of executive branch departments, fiscal oversight of the judicial
branch was transferred from one department to another.
33
27. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
28. See Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 217 (1791).
29. See Act of May 17, 1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 276-77 (1792).
30. See Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 334-35 (1793).
31. See Act of Mar. 3, 1803, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 244 (1803).
32. See Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 50, 2 Stat. 643 (1821).
33. See Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 98, 9 Stat. 395 (1849) (providing that until 1849, fiscal
oversight of the judiciary was exercised by Treasury. When Congress passed An Act to establish
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Although the need for central administrative policies and controls emerged
gradually with the growth of a system of largely autonomous courts headed by
judges and staffed by their clerks, no formal leadership structure was in place to
develop, implement, and enforce them. Nor did successive Chief Justices of the
Supreme Court, with few exceptions, aspire to such leadership of the inferior
courts.
3 4
In 1870, Congress authorized creation of the Department of Justice and
transferred to it from the Department of Interior responsibility for fiscal
administration of the federal courts.35 Justice's acceptance and elaboration of
the charge took significant forms for a judiciary unaccustomed to external
controls. Annual operating budgets for the courts were to be included in the
funding Congress appropriated for the department. Funding allocations from the
department to the courts were handled by Justice through its agents in the courts,
the U.S. marshals. Beyond appropriations, the department established personnel
standards and other policies designed to rein in the careless and obstinate manner
in which some courts conducted their non-judicial business. When it first
assumed these administrative responsibilities, the department complained about
the lack of cooperation by judges and court managers, many of whom found this
imposition of external controls by the executive branch intrusive. The
department encountered mixed success when, for example, it required court
clerks to disclose financial transactions. Some judges steadfastly refused to
comply with hiring standards set forth by the department. Others resisted the
department's fiscal policies and refused to cooperate with reporting
requirements.
The department generally refrained from exercising direct administrative
control over individual judges or court clerks for fear of damaging the occasional
the Home Department, and to provide for the Treasury Department an Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury, and a Commissioner of the Customs, it transferred that oversight responsibility to the
newly created Department of the Interior. Section 4 ordains: "That the supervisory power now
exercised by the Secretary of the Treasury over the accounts of the marshals, clerks, and other
officers of all the courts of the United States, shall be exercised by the Secretary of the Interior,
who shall sign all requisitions for the advance or payment of money out of the treasury, on
estimates or accounts, subject to the same control now exercised on like estimates or accounts by
the First Auditor and First Comptroller of the Treasury.").
34. Whatever supervision over the operations and administration of the inferior courts the
various chief justices exercised was largely incidental to their circuit-riding duties as circumstances
dictated; in most such matters, the fledgling lower courts were left to themselves. Overseeing
them was a low priority for the Supreme Court, as well as for the Congress.
35. See Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870) (In language lifted nearly verbatim
from the earlier act of March 13, 1849, transferring oversight from Treasury to Interior, § 15
prescribes "That the supervisory powers now exercised by the Secretary of the Interior over the
accounts of the district attorneys, marshals, clerks, and other officers of the courts of the United
States shall be exercised by the Attorney-General .... ").
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tenuous relations between the judiciary and government prosecutors. Over the
next fifty years, however, the department gradually expanded the scope of
administrative oversight of the courts and tightened its controls, asserting itself
in everything from regulating the salaries of clerks to establishing appointment
standards for support staff positions. The department established the allocation
of budgets, supplies, files, furniture, and other court needs. Accordingly,
Congress held the department accountable for the proper use of those goods and
services, and therefore, the department could demand an accounting from the
courts in such matters. The department also gathered productivity statistics of
the courts and duly reported them to the Congress. Administering these services
and holding the courts accountable gave the department an element of control
and simultaneously created an environment of dependence that, in the view of a
growing number of judges, breached the principle of separate powers.36
The judiciary's formal initiative to liberate itself from this external
oversight and to establish a mechanism for self-governance began in the early
1920s. On September 14, 1922, in response to the leadership of Chief Justice
William H. Taft, Congress authorized creation of the Conference of Senior
Circuit Judges to serve as the principal policy-making body for the federal trial
and intermediate appellate courts. This special judges' conference comprised the
senior circuit judge from each circuit and would be presided over by the chief
justice. Among other institutional functions, it was to foster adoption of
standard administrative procedures among the federal courts. The act's
significance for the judiciary was fundamental; it authorized the judicial branch
to establish an executive forum of judges tasked with policy-making and
administrative governance of the inferior federal tribunals. With the formation
of this new leadership body, the status of the judiciary had taken a major
organizational step toward achieving institutional independence. The actual
transition from the control exercised by Justice, however, was anything but
immediate. This came as a result of: (1) few administrative mechanisms in
place, (2) the judiciary had no cadre of professional administrators with broad
organizational experience, and (3) in light of disagreement among the senior
circuit judges as to how an internal support structure for the judiciary should be
crafted and what authority it should yield vis-A-vis the judges. Thus, Justice
36. Adherence to such sentiment was by no means universal. Growing congressional and
Executive Branch dissatisfaction with the administrative operation of a loosely organized federal
judiciary on appellate and particularly trial levels was shared by the bar. This prompted testimony
from bar leaders critical of growing case backlogs, arrogant judges, and judicial misconduct.
Federal judges were not administratively beholden to a central authority charged with keeping
them in line. Thus, inspiring a variety of legislative initiatives, including, in the later 1930s, the
Roosevelt Administration's proposal for a "Proctor" with broad authority to gather and publicize
court productivity statistics and to recommend procedural reforms for expediting the processing of
court caseloads.
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would continue to oversee the judiciary's bureaucracy for more than fifteen
years.
In the interim, tensions continued to smolder between the department and
the judges. The newly formed conference first met in December 1922. At this
meeting and subsequent meetings, a major agenda item was the report by the
attorney general37 on the business of the United States Courts and a statistical
overview of court productivity. As one might expect, the attorney general's
reports at these conferences focused largely on matters of interest and
importance to Justice-government litigation in general and criminal
prosecutions in particular. The reports also featured a smorgasbord of
complaints from the U.S. attorneys, who prosecuted defendants in federal court,
about judicial behavior, arrogance, and sluggishness in processing caseload. The
attorney general did not hesitate to suggest to the conference how court functions
and procedures might be improved, how judges might adopt new management
practices, and what the conference could do to support a legislative agenda in
Congress that would be advantageous to the department. Occasionally, the
attorney general complained that federal judges were imposing sentences that, in
the department's judgment, were too lenient. He criticized the judiciary for
failure to institute more uniform sentencing guidelines, the result of which was
disparity in sentencing, not only among different courts but between different
judges in the same court.
The judges complained about a host of administrative matters. They did
not appreciate the department's presumptive role as administrative overseer and
fiscal agent of the Article III judiciary. They did not want Justice, as an entity of
the executive branch, performing an array of sensitive oversight and
housekeeping duties for the judicial branch. They wanted the department to
advocate more funding for the courts and to assist in streamlining the procedural
requirements that protracted the civil adjudication process. Senior circuit judges
complained of the need for adequate law libraries, additional judgeships, better
court facilities, more personnel, and larger budgets.
A major flash point was who should represent the judicial branch's funding
requirements before the legislature. Because the legislative branch has the
constitutional authority to appropriate funding to the various branches and
37. In the United States Government, the attorney general is a civilian position similar to the
position of minister of justice in European countries and exercises comparable authority. The
attorney general serves as the head of the Department of Justice, but also serves as the chief public
prosecutor of the United States Government. See §§ 4, 5, 8, 16, 16 Stat. 162 (a position in some
European countries that exists separate and distinct from the Attorney General. Given the
Department of Justice's statutory authority to exercise fiscal oversight of the inferior courts at the
time the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges was created, the attorney general was invited to
participate in conference meetings and to deliver a report on the administration of those courts).
38. PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 53-55 (1973).
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agencies of the government, many judges saw it as a conflict of interest and
breach of the separation of powers doctrine for the attorney general to act as the
judicial branch's fiscal intermediary with the Congress. Budgetary requirements
established to fund judiciary operations were reviewed by the department and
jointly submitted with its own. The attorney general was required by statute to
report each January to the Congress on the business of the department, including
federal criminal statistical trends,39 and department officials appeared at
legislative hearings to explain the judiciary's funding and justify its resource
requirements. In some instances, funds requested on behalf of the judiciary were
scaled back by the Bureau of the Budget, igniting judicial outrage and
provoking demands for judicial branch self-representation before Congress.
Department officials also represented the judiciary in other initiatives before the
Congress, such as pursuing judicial branch legislation. Legislation sought by the
Conference of Senior Circuit Judges representing the judicial arm of the
government, was subject to interpretation by the Department of Justice, the
prosecutorial arm of the government. The conflict, clear in the mind of judicial
branch loyalists and sympathizers alike, was that representation of the judiciary's
needs by the agency that advocates the government's interests in judicial forums
was suspect; at the least, the department would incline to pursue Judicial Branch
legislation favorable to its objectives and priorities.
Although some judges directly challenged the attorney general's exercise of
such authority, others opted for a less-confrontational and more diplomatic
approach. Even though it raised issues of ethics and propriety, pragmatic
judicial officials shrewdly concluded that the best avenue for maximizing
judiciary appropriations was to cooperate with the attorney general. Some chief
justices established strong working relationships with the attorney general.
Others, such as Chief Justice Taft, sought to influence the appointment of
candidates for the office of attorney general, throwing their support to those they
calculated would actively promote the judiciary's agenda.4 1
Just how well the department administered the federal courts and
represented their interests before the Congress is disputable. What is clear,
however, is that disagreement and tension often fractured the relationship
between the department and the conference. The continuing tension led to a
succession of proposals for a delegation of administrative oversight and
management less intrusive on the institutional independence of the judiciary.
Later proposals addressed the source of the tension more directly, articulating the
objective of shifting authority and responsibility for governing and administering
the courts from the executive to the judicial branch. Eventually an agreement
39. § 12, 15 Stat. 162.
40. FisH, supra note 38, at 123.
41. Id. at 76.
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was negotiated, and on August 7, 1939, Congress passed an act entitled "The
Administration of the United States Courts" which, among other provisions,
established an Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The Act
called for the appointment of a director who, as the chief administrative officer
of the federal judiciary and "under the supervision and direction of the
conference of senior circuit judges . . . .43 would have the responsibility for a
host of administrative and business services heretofore performed by the
Department of Justice for the inferior courts. 44  The Act also authorized the
director, under the conference of senior circuit judges, to "prepare and submit
annually to the Bureau of the Budget estimates of the expenditures and
appropriations necessary for the maintenance and operation of the United States
courts . . . . 45 To discourage other Executive Branch intrusion into Judicial
Branch funding, the Act specifically prohibited the Bureau of the Budget from
adjusting the judiciary's proposed budget submissions to the Congress, although
it could advise reductions.
46
This watershed act has several other important provisions, one of which is
the creation of councils of judges in each circuit 47 to ensure expeditious
transaction of the work of the trial courts within the circuit. This provision
distributed authority for governance of the judicial branch broadly among these
newly formed judicial councils, tasking them with the responsibility for
managing the affairs of the courts within their circuits and creating opportunity
for judges in all circuits to participate in branch governance. Creation of these
councils reinforced the institutional independence of the judicial branch by
establishing formal representation bodies at the regional level.
Although not all of the department's oversight responsibilities were
promptly transferred with passage of the act, creation of the Administrative
Office substantially breached the dependence of the trial and intermediate
appellate courts on the department. Today the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, located in Washington, D.C., provides a variety of administrative support
42. Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223.
43. § 304, 53 Stat. at 1223.
44. For example, the director is charged in section 304(1) with "[aill administrative matters
relating to the offices of the clerks and other clerical and administrative personnel of the courts, ...
" while reserving the authority of the courts to appoint clerks and other supporting personnel; in
section 304(2) with "[e]xamining the state of the dockets of the various courts[;].. " in section
304(3) with "[t]he disbursement.., of the moneys appropriated for the maintenance, support, and
operation of the courts;" in section 304(4) with "[t]he purchase, exchange, transfer, and
distribution of equipment and supplies... "§ 304, 53 Stat. at 1223.
45. § 305, 53 Stat. at 1224.
46. "All estimates so submitted shall be included in the Budget without revision (but subject to
the recommendations of the Bureau of the Budget thereon), in the same manner as is provided for
the estimates of the Supreme Court by section 201 of said Act." § 305, 53 Stat. at 1224.
47. § 306, 53 Stat. at 1224.
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services for the U.S. Courts and works through the Judicial Conference to pursue
appropriations and other legislation that serve the interests of the federal
judiciary.
The next major initiative was undertaken in 1948, when Congress, on the
initiative of the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, enacted 28 U.S.C. § 331,48
which changed the name of that body to the Judicial Conference of the United
States. Fewer than ten years later, in 1957, membership of the conference was
increased with the addition of a federal district judge from each circuit. Over the
past 50 years, the Judicial Conference has evolved into a distinguished and
powerful governance and oversight body for the administration and leadership of
the judicial branch. It is recognized by the Congress and the President as the
governing policy making body for the judiciary. Members of the conference
appear regularly at legislative hearings to testify and respond to inquiries relating
to the judiciary's budget and the impact of proposed legislation on the judicial
branch. They also meet with representatives of the Executive Branch to
facilitate a better understanding of the needs of the federal judiciary.
Although the Conference only meets twice each year for two-day meetings,
much of its preparatory work is undertaken by a network of committees tasked
with providing advice and making recommendations to the Conference.
49
Committee members, with a few exceptions, consist of federal trial and appellate
judges. Committee jurisdiction is carefully defined by the Conference and the
Chief Justice, and it ranges over a broad array of governance matters relating to
the administrative operations and management of the judiciary. 50
48. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000).
49. Although the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges established committees as early as 1922,
their number was small and their status generally temporary. Chief Justice Stone's initiatives
enlarged their number, and in the early 1940's, following creation of the Administrative Office,
numerous new committees were created. As the committee system evolved, committee longevity
typically shifted from ad hoc to permanent status. FISH, supra note 38, at 269.
50. As of November 2005, the committees of the Judicial Conference of the United States are
as follows: Executive Committee (the senior executive arm of the Judicial Conference); Committee
on the Administrative Office (to oversee the operations of the Administrative Office); Committee
on Automation and Technology (to provide policy recommendations and planning oversight of the
judiciary automation program); Committee on the Administration of the Bankruptcy System (to
oversee the bankruptcy system); Committee on the Budget (to assemble and present to Congress
the Judicial Branch budget); Committee on Codes of Conduct (to advise on the application of the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges and other judicial branch codes of conduct and Titles III
(relating to gifts to federal employees) and VI (relating to limitations on outside earned income,
honoraria, and outside employment) of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, as amended)); Committee
on Court Administration and Case Management (to study and make recommendations on matters
affecting case management, the operation of appellate, district, and bankruptcy clerks' offices, jury
administration, and other court operational matters); Committee on Criminal Law (to oversee the
federal probation system and review legislation and other issues relating to the administration of
the criminal law); Committee on Defender Services (to oversee the provision of legal
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III. MILESTONES IN ACHIEVING INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE
In the more than 200 years since passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, it has
been the experience of the United States Judiciary that although the judicial
function may be identified in a constitution or follow-up legislation as separate
but equal, and that although a constitution or laws that build on it may provide
broadly for the independence of judges, there are no guarantees. The larger
institutional context and framework of government within which the judiciary
operates may threaten, undermine, ignore, or call for the repeal of those
declarations under any number of presumptive justifications, typically political
and inflammatory in character. It is there that judicial leaders must exercise due
vigilance. The interpretation of proclamations regarding independence and the
legislation generated to foster their implementation need to be carefully
monitored. Judicial leaders, empowered through formal judicial system
governance structures established on legislative initiative, should use their
influence and the authority of their office to ensure that in the evolution of
mature governmental institutions, the judiciary attains institutional independence
from and self-governing parity with the other branches. Reviewing some general
guidelines about institutional context and how it can impede judicial
independence may prove helpful here.
A. Judicial System Governance by a Council of Presiding Judges
Democratic governments recognize the need to establish judicial system
governance structures, and legislative or parliamentary bodies enact laws that
detail the organization of those structures and establish the authority with which
representation to defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford an adequate defense); Committee
on Federal-State Jurisdiction (to analyze proposed changes in federal jurisdiction and to serve as
liaison with state courts); Committee on Financial Disclosure (to supervise the filing and review of
financial disclosure reports by judicial officers and employees); Committee on Intercircuit
Assignments (to assist the Chief Justice in assigning and designating Article III judges for service
outside their circuits); Committee on International Judicial Relations (to foster and coordinate
relations with foreign judiciaries and related organizations and agencies committed to promote the
rule of law); Committee on the Judicial Branch (to address problems affecting the judiciary as an
institution and affecting the status of federal judicial officers); Committee on Judicial Resources
(to oversee the administration of human resource development needs, assessments, requirements,
and allocation for the Judicial Branch); Committee on the Administration of the Magistrate Judges
System (to oversee the federal magistrate judges system); Committee to Review Circuit Council
Conduct and Disability Orders (to review circuit council action on judicial misconduct and
disability complaints and to review related legislative proposals); Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure (to study the operation and effect of the federal rules of practice and procedure with
support from advisory committees on the appellate, bankruptcy, civil, criminal, and evidence
rules); Committee on Security and Facilities (to oversee the security, space, and facilities programs
of the judiciary). See Judicial Councils & Conferences,
http://www.uscourts.gov/understanding-courts/89914.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2006).
[Vol. 14:1
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
they are to act. A typical European model is the governing council. The
responsibilities of these councils differ from one country to the next, both in
their scope and in the authority delegated to them,5 1 but they all play key roles in
making important determinations on judicial branch policies, governance,
development, administration, judicial selection, tenure, and discipline.
However, in many instances and unlike the Judicial Conference of the
United States, the membership of these councils includes, in addition to judicial
officers: (1) high-level officials from the political branches or agencies of the
government such as members of the parliament or legislature; (2) executive
branch representatives; (3) members of the council of ministers such as the
minister of justice; 52 and (4) heads of independent justice-related agencies, such
as the prosecutor general. Some council includes non-government
representatives such as prominent attorneys and senior-level law professors.
Even though judges serve on councils and frequently sit in the majority, political
branch and other non-judicial members bring to these councils non-judicial
interests, priorities, and perspectives. Although there may be value in the
contributions of these non-judicial members, granting them full membership and
voting status in the body tasked with judicial branch governance suggests a
democratic model of government in which the judicial branch is subordinate to
the political branch. This formal participation by the other branches in judicial
branch governance structures constitutes, at best, a benign intrusion into high-
level judicial branch affairs and policymaking. To assert that the judiciary is as
independent as an institutional entity, and to simultaneously mandate standing
membership for political branch officials in these governance councils, invokes a
tension that is parasitic on the claim of independence.
If these mixed councils were a common feature of the other branches of
government, their significance for this issue of institutional independence would
still be troubling, but the discrepancy afforded the judicial branch would
evaporate. However, no statutory provisions exist that establish executive
oversight structures, such as political branch councils, that mandate the
membership or participation of judicial branch representatives. No legislative
acts authorize judges to sit on the council of ministers or to participate in the
leadership hierarchy of a parliament or national assembly. The issue, then, is
why the governance structure of the judiciary should include these non-judicial
51. See supra note 19 (constitutional references to and brief descriptions of various Central and
East European judiciary councils and their authority).
52. Recall that the Attorney General of the United States, roughly equivalent to a minister of
justice, routinely addressed meetings of the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges and served as the
liaison between the Judicial Branch and the Congress on matters affecting the courts. The
Attorney General did so until the responsibility for fiscal oversight of the courts to be exercised
under the supervision of the Chief Justice and the Judicial Conference was transferred to the
Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
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participants. If there is no reciprocation in the political branches, then the
assertion that the judiciary is co-equal with them and institutionally independent
fails on the merits.
53
Some may argue that the power vested by the government in the judiciary
appropriately requires the oversight of the legislative and executive functions.
Clearly, however, those oversight controls already exist and tilt the ultimate
balance of power in favor of the political branches. The judiciary exercises no
independent control over the purse of the government-the revenue sources
essential to underwrite its operations. For that, it is wholly dependent upon
legislative initiative, a control sufficient in itself and duly exercised. Moreover,
in a number of governments, constitutional or statutory authority provides the
legislative branch the ability to impeach and try high-level judicial officials for
serious violations of their oath of office.
The judiciary also exercises no direct control over the sword of the
government - the military, police, or other civil order and law enforcement
entities-as instruments to execute its judgments; for that, it is wholly dependent
upon the cooperation of the executive arm of the government, again, sufficient
control in itself and duly exercised. Moreover, the executive retains the power to
prosecute judges on criminal charges. To argue that additional institutional
oversight and governance controls are required is to argue that the judiciary,
although vested with the authority of the state to interpret and apply the law,
effectively is incapable of governing itself. Such logic collides with
constitutional provisions that the judiciary is co-equal and independent; it
concedes that the principle of the separation of powers, although theoretically
desirable, is impractical from the perspective of institutional utility.
The initiative that judges and other judicial branch guardians should press
for is the support for legislative amendments to enabling laws that preclude the
appointment of political branch officials to these governing councils, restricting
their membership to senior-level judicial branch officials. Once purged, these
governing councils should be vested with the requisite authority and
responsibility for governance and oversight of all internal judicial system
management, administration, operations, policy making, and procedural
guidance. To conserve their attention and energy for executive oversight and
policy formulation, these councils should delegate day-to-day administrative
authority to the director of a support organization or bureau that reports to
judicial authority and is tasked with provisioning and assisting the courts to
53. This is not to suggest that it is inappropriate or violative of the separation of powers
principle to include, as guests, the equivalent of a high-level judicial conference political branch
official to address matters of inter-branch or government-wide concern and interest, just as judicial
branch officials may be invited to address executive branch forums or testify in legislative hearings




perform their functions. The concept of such an administrative support bureau is
discussed below.
As a corollary to this self-governing authority, the judiciary should wield
some control over the procedural framework within which judges perform their
official functions and exercise their authority. 54 This includes the prerogative to
establish and enforce system-wide rules of process and procedure consistent with
legislative intent. It also contemplates the authority of each level of court to
make and enforce local rules governing the conduct of its business and the
processing of cases insofar as those rules are consistent with the national rules
promulgated by the supreme governing judicial council and relevant legislative
intent. The legislative branch may reserve the right to review and modify such
national rules.55  The initiative of granting the judicial branch rule-making
authority should be addressed jointly by representatives of both branches,
legislative and judicial. Once granted, the rule-making process should be public
and actively involve not only judges, but also representatives of the practicing
bar. Proposed rules and amendments to existing rules should be publicized with
requests for comments from the bar and the public. The context in which the
rules and amendments to them are issued should make clear the authority of the
judiciary to enforce compliance, regardless of the status of the parties. The rules
should apply equally to all attorneys and to all litigants.
B. Truncating Adjudication and Prosecution
Under the separation of powers doctrine, distinct functions are defined and
authority is apportioned among the divisions of the government to create a
balance of power and to foster a framework of tension that maintains it. The
relationship between the branches is set forth in the constitution and the
observance of those laws by all branches serves to maintain political stability
and preserve the institutions of government.
The institutional framework of a democratically oriented government
characteristically provides for law enforcement and prosecution functions within
54. This position was advocated broadly by Virginia Delegate Edmund Randolph, with regard
to the legislation that eventually resulted in passage on September 24 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Randolph, who subsequently would be appointed the first Attorney General of the United States,
wrote to James Madison on June 30 that "[t]he minute detail ought to be consigned to the judges.
Every attempt towards it must be imperfect, and being so may become a topic of ridicule to
technical men .... I wish even now that the judges of the [S]upreme [C]ourt were first to be called
upon, before a definitive step shall be taken." Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison
(June 30, 1789), in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789-1800, at 432-433 (Maeva Marcus ed., Columbia Univ. Press 1992).
55. In the United States, for example, the Rules Enabling Act specifies that the "Supreme Court
and all courts established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct
of their business. Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and
procedure prescribed under section 2072 of this title." 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1994).
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the executive arm under a department or ministry of interior, justice, or
equivalent. To sustain the tension between the prosecutorial and the adjudicative
functions of government, between prosecutor and judge, judicial functions are
installed in a separate branch or department. Ideally, that branch is neither
ideologically nor administratively aligned with the prosecutorial and
enforcement functions; nor should it be supported by them. Some European
scholars argue that this separation-of-powers model of democratic government is
but one of several and not necessarily the most desirable. They suggest that in
the interest of efficiency, having a justice ministry exercise administrative
oversight of the judicial and prosecutorial functions of the government is
politically manageable and economically more feasible. Further, such an
arrangement neither violates nor undermines the objective of an independent
judiciary. Indeed, in the continental civil law tradition, this is an accepted
model5 and one that justice ministry officials in some Central and East
European countries invoke to justify the oversight and control functions that
their ministries perform for their judiciaries.57
It is also a common model in the emerging democracies of Central and East
Europe, where, to varying degrees, justice ministries are tasked with the
organizational functions of (1) prosecution to uphold the law and protect the
interests of the government, and (2) adjudication of disputes through analysis
and interpretation of the law. In this model, the minister of justice, or
equivalent, serves as both the executive prosecutorial officer for the government
and as the executive administrator of the judiciary. 5 8  This organizational
56. See supra note 22.
57. In a meeting with Poland's Vice Minister of Justice, the Honorable Janusz Niemcewicz and
two of his associates on June 9, 1997, the author contrasted the Ministry's strong role in
governance of the Polish Judiciary with the self-governing structure of the federal judiciary of the
United States. One of the associates, Zloig Sczcaska, Ph.D., who oversees public relations for the
prosecutorial division of the Ministry of Justice, responded that the differences between common
and civil-law systems justify the Ministry's administrative control of the judiciary in the latter. He
went on to characterize the American preoccupation with the separation of powers doctrine as a
peculiar aberration in political theory, attributable primarily to Montesque.
58. In Croatia, for example, although the Law of Courts provides authority for court presidents,
equivalent to chief judges, to exercise certain oversight and self-policing functions in their own as
well as in the lower courts, many administrative oversight responsibilities are delegated to the
Ministry of Justice. These include, but are not limited to, the following:
*review and monitor the constitution, work methodology, and operations of the courts and take
such action as is required to promote court productivity;
*review and maintain records on the status and professional advancement of court personnel;
*determine criteria - including judicial workload levels - for allocating judgeships;
*provide the supplies, equipment, and other goods and services required for court operations;
*issue orders and other instructions necessary to implement effective court administration;
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structure presumes that the interests of the state under the law, which the
prosecutorial function exists to promote and defend, are compatible with the
broader interest of securing justice, that there is a convergence of interest in the
prosecutor's zealous advocacy in enforcing the law and the judge's impartial role
in interpreting and applying the law. These are, at best, tenuous propositions.
Even under ideal circumstances, an inherent tension exists where the
judicial system is managed by and administratively subordinate to the minister of
justice who also manages the prosecutorial arm of the government. 59 Although
it may not manifest itself directly, there will be occasions when the outcome of
the work of the judicial function will be in conflict with that sought by the
prosecutorial function. There will be instances where the judiciary's reasoned
view of justice will confront and reject that advocated by the prosecution and, by
association, the state.
Where the judiciary interprets the law to subordinate the interests of the
state to the dictates of justice, it places itself at risk if it is subject to the oversight
of the minister, an appointed official sworn to uphold the interests of the state
under the law. Within such a framework, the judiciary as an institution cannot
accurately be described as an independent and separate arm of the government.
Such a framework, however benign, invites manipulation of the judiciary where
it is perceived as uncooperative in pursuing the government's agenda.
*analyze court performance and productivity to ensure compliance with existing laws and
regulations;
*investigate court-related complaints dealing with how the courts are administered, the efficiency
of legal proceedings, and public and client relations;
*provide automation support to the courts;
*develop and approve rules of procedure for the courts;
*determine compensation and remuneration levels for lay judges;
*provide rules for the design of judicial robes;
*review and consent to the number of technical, professional, and clerical support staff positions in
the courts;
*develop regulations governing the qualifications, performance standards, and other matters
related to the employment of court support staff;
*establish the number of judicial trainees authorized for employment in the courts;
*determine the regulations that govern how the fiscal and procurement functions of the courts are
to be carried out.
59. There are, however, some exceptions to this model. In Macedonia and Hungary, for
example, the prosecutorial function is vested under law in the office of a separate and independent
Prosecutor General who does not report to the Minister of Justice. Such a tri-parte division of
justice-related functions palliates the ethical quandary of cross-purposes when adjudicative and
prosecutorial functions co-exist under a single umbrella of authority and administrative oversight.
However, the separation of powers issue remains unresolved and gnaws at claims that the judiciary
is independent when it is administered by an agency of the Executive Branch under the direction of
an appointed official.
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Where, as in many of the world's emerging democracies, scarce
governmental resources must be sparingly allocated and frequently are sufficient
to fund only the most fundamental operations of government, the needs of the
judiciary may be determined by a minister to be subordinate to those of the
prosecution and underfunded accordingly. Such determinations are the
appropriate province of the people's assembly or parliament whose
representatives, unlike an appointed official, are directly accountable to the
people.
Where a justice minister is persuaded that the judiciary is undermining the
interests of the state by ruling too often against its perceived interests, subtle
retaliation may result in those areas in which the minister exercises
administrative oversight over the judiciary-from more stringent resource
allocation to ideological litmus tests for prospective judges, from subtle
manipulation of the nominee approval process to media grandstanding about out-
of-control, extremist judges, 60 and from postponing authorization for critically
needed support personnel to withholding equipment and expertise for automating
court operations. The organizational structure of government and the
distribution of power within that structure should minimize the potential for such
retaliation and manipulation; the most effective model is based on the concept of
the institutional separation of powers.
C. Creating an Internal Administrative Support Organization
Transferring responsibility for the administrative management of the
judicial branch from the ministry of justice entails creation by the legislative
branch of a separate and permanent organizational structure within the judiciary.
There may be detractors in the assembly or parliament who argue for
maintaining administrative management and oversight of the judiciary in the
ministry and who criticize proposals to form another costly administrative
bureau. They also may undermine the effort to effect a clean transfer of the
administrative authority and responsibility to the judiciary by seeking to reserve
key authority, such as fiscal oversight, to the ministry. These detractors fail to
appreciate the importance of ensuring against conflicts of interest that plague
systems in which administrative control of the judiciary is vested in a non-
60. As is well documented in the United States, such political intrigues and maneuvers are not
uncommon, and their destructive potential for undermining public confidence in the courts is a
serious one. However, they typically originate not with the attorney general but with legislative




judicial organization and how such external control compromises the objective
of attaining an independent judiciary. 6 '
Ideally, this new judicial branch agency or bureau should not be attached to
any court whose needs might dominate its resource capacity at the cost of
compromising effective service to the whole. Organizationally, it should fall
within the hierarchy of the judiciary, and its administrator should answer to the
presiding justice of the Supreme Court, chair of the judicial council, or other
institutional authority designated as the head of the governing body of the
judiciary. This bureau should provide administrative services and support to the
institutional governance structure of the judiciary and to all judicial branch
courts. Such an office would ease the burden on the judicial governance
structure by handling many of the administrative functions relative to supporting
the court system in the areas of budget, finance, court automation, human
resources, day-to-day liaison and advocacy with the legislative branch, and other
categories of expert assistance. Initially, given limited funding and to the extent
that legislative approval is required, such an administrative bureau might start
out with modest aspirations and a small staff whose number would expand over
time as additional funding was made available.
Planning for the bureau should be undertaken with care to ensure the
enabling legislation comprehends the broad scope of functions such a bureau
should perform. The legislation should provide for a single bureau rather than
several offices among which the functions and responsibility are distributed; the
various offices proposed in the following section should all fall within the
organizational structure of one administrative entity.
D. Achieving Self-Representation in Budgetary Matters
Constitutional or legislative provisions that the judiciary is independent
become suspect when the control of the resources essential to the operation of
the judiciary is vested in the executive arm of the government, essentially a
second stage of control after the legislative branch allocates broad categories of
revenue for the various functions of government. Judicial systems are not self-
.• 62
sustaining; their operating costs must be funded by sources under the control of
elected representatives of the people to ensure appropriate accountability. As
such, judiciaries operate from a subordinate position and are subject to meddling
61. The Hungarian Parliament authorized creation of such a judicial branch administrative
bureau several years ago to serve the judiciary and, in doing so, transferred a number of
administrative oversight functions from the Ministry of Justice to this new bureau.
62. There is growing enthusiasm in some quarters to attach fees and related charges for services
provided by court systems to offset operating costs and revenue requirements. Such initiatives,
however, risk excluding from the process some of the most vulnerable litigants judicial systems
exist to protect by imposing unmanageable financial burdens on them that compromise their ability
to seek justice.
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by the legislative function that controls the purse. It is a reality with which
judicial systems must contend and which the constitution and the laws that
spring from it should anticipate and minimize.
This subordination is needlessly exacerbated and the dependence
compounded when an additional layer of authority and control is imposed on the
judiciary's ability to obtain the resources it needs in order to function. The most
common example, and one with which the United States judiciary once wrestled,
is an executive branch ministry or department authorized to oversee the
formulation, advocacy, and fiscal administration of the judiciary's budget.
The oversight responsibility usually takes two forms. First, ministry
representatives appear before the legislative arm of the government to seek
funding for ministry needs, of which the judiciary's needs become a subset. This
excludes the Judicial Branch from the opportunity to appear before and directly
advocate its interests and needs before the elected representatives and encumbers
Judicial Branch independence. The presiding judges of the Supreme and
constitutional courts in some countries do appear and advocate their respective
courts' budget requirements directly before the appropriate legislative body.
However, the inferior courts of those countries are beholden to their respective
ministries; there is no judicial branch authority to advocate system needs before
the legislature on behalf of the judiciary as a whole. Inferior court interests and
needs are subject to ministry interpretation and risk being filtered through
ministry policies and priorities that may or may not comport with and promote
those of the judiciary. This reporting arrangement also precludes the judiciary
from engaging in periodic and necessary dialogue with the Legislative Branch
and from responding on its own to legitimate legislative inquiries and concerns
about judicial system function and performance.
Second, once the legislative arm has determined the level of funding for the
judiciary and appropriated it, distribution of that funding is subject to ministry
control and monitoring. Because the ministry is accountable, it also supervises
the procurement function for the judiciary. It is not uncommon for the ministry
to micro-manage this monitoring function. Under such administrative
subordination, judicial officials lack the authority to procure equipment
necessary to perform court services and conduct operations. Instead, they are
compelled to petition the ministry, justify the need, and wait while the
bureaucratic review and authorization processes run their course.
The irony strikes home when the constitution declares the judiciary is an
independent branch of government, but the presiding judge of a large
metropolitan court of appeals must justify in writing his secretary's need for a
new computer or his chief administrator's requirement for a new facsimile
machine. Although, taken strictly, this administrative context is not part of the
adjudicative process, failure to adequately staff, equip, and supply the judiciary
directly impacts its work and the efficiency with which it dispatches the
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administration of justice. To that extent, it constrains judicial independence and
undermines the institutional integrity of the system.
In effect, to validate its status as an independent arm of the government, the
judicial branch should represent itself before and communicate its resource
requirements directly to the legislative arm, not through a competing agency
supervised by an appointed official. Moreover, once funding levels have been
established and approved, the appropriation should be transmitted directly to an
administrative structure within the judicial branch, not to an intermediary in the
executive branch. There is movement in this direction in several countries in
East and Central Europe, as noted below.
63
Judicial system officials must recognize that delegation by the Legislative
Branch to the judiciary of the authority to develop, advocate, and manage its
budget carries with it the assumption of fiscal responsibility for monitoring the
expenditure of appropriated funds and for all associated accounting and auditing
functions. The judiciary must be in a position to demonstrate to the legislative
organs the capability to managing its financial affairs and to do so in compliance
with the strictest government standards. This entails staffing the administrative
ranks of judicial support structures with financial, accounting, statistical,
planning, and budget specialists and managers to ensure that funds allocated to
the judiciary are utilized according to the procurement and other regulations set
forth for government entities. 64  Working together, these specialists should
develop formulae that relate caseload to positions or work units on the basis of
statistically verified models of what is required to complete the tasks essential to
court operations. Once these formulae have been tested and validated, costs can
be associated with them and used as the basis for computing the annual budget
that the judiciary submits to the legislative branch for review and approval. By
basing its budgetary requests on quantifiable and validated standards and
formulae, the judiciary will establish the credibility and legitimacy of its
budgetary requirements.
Assumption of this fiscal responsibility should trigger the appointment of a
special committee or standing group of presiding judicial officers knowledgeable
in matters regarding budgetary and financial management to ensure that: (1) the
judiciary's annual budgetary requests are coherently formulated and can be
63. See supra note 19.
64. In the Republic of Hungary, for example, the Parliament recently authorized creation of a
bureau within the judiciary that is tasked with a variety of responsibilities relating to the
administration of the court system, including budgetary authority. Several of the officials with
responsibility for managing the judiciary's budget are trained economists and financial managers
who performed similar functions for the judiciary while employed with the Ministry of Justice.
When those functions were shifted from the ministry to the judiciary, these officials were ideally
suited and experienced to effect the transition and to provide the judiciary with the requisite
financial management expertise.
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justified to the legislative officials; and (2) funding, once allocated, is distributed
equitably among the various courts that the judiciary comprises. This, in turn,
should trigger creation of standards that define cost thresholds for space,
furniture, furnishings, equipment, and other work-related items purchased with
government funds. These standards should be endorsed and approved at the
highest levels of the governance structure of the judiciary to ensure broad
compliance across all levels of judicial officers and court officials.
It also will require general salary standards for the various categories of
support positions within the judiciary. Each of these categories should have
specific qualifications and experience requirements attached to it to ensure that
salaries are as commensurate as possible to the value of the work performed and
the level of expertise brought to bear upon the work. There are myriad ways in
which the trust and confidence of the Legislative Branch can be undermined if
the judiciary fails to adequately manage and execute the budgetary authority
delegated to it and if it fails to establish and apply objective and measurable
standards related to allocation of its appropriations, procurement of its
equipment and supplies, and compensation of its employees.
Assumption of this fiscal responsibility should trigger creation of an office
of audit to ensure that funds allocated to the judiciary are expended in a manner
that is responsible and that comports with the regulations and guidelines
established by the government. The functions of this office should include
making periodic visits to the various courts to review court financial and
procurement records to determine compliance with those policies. As a follow-
up to these visits, the office should prepare reports that detail the auditors'
findings and outline actions necessary to remedy violations, such as applying
appropriate standard practices, procedures, policies, and regulations. Where
audits reveal possible fraud, embezzlement, or other criminal activity, the
guidelines should provide for prompt notification of authorities so investigations
can be initiated.
Assumption of this fiscal responsibility also should trigger the development
and the conducting of training programs for court presidents, administrative
managers, and other staff who will be tasked with these new financial functions.
If the judiciary is to demonstrate that it can shoulder both the authority and the
responsibility for budget planning, management, and execution, it must ensure
that those who are directly responsible for it have the requisite training. Several
governments, as noted above, already have taken the initiative to establish
independent budget authority for their judicial systems.65 Others have taken the
65 See supra notes 61 & 64.
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initial steps to bring the issue before their respective legislative bodies for
consideration.
66
E. Abandoning the Legacy of Dependence
In many of the countries under discussion, a legacy of subordination of the
judiciary to state interests and to the party apparatus, and exploitation of the
judiciary by the state as an official device to validate its prerogatives continues
to cloud how judges and court systems are perceived. The residuals of this
legacy are lingering sentiments of fear of, distrust in, and contempt for the
institution of the judiciary, frequently perpetuated by a hostile media.
Overcoming this legacy is a burden with which these judiciaries continue to
wrestle, often ineffectively. That the legacy continues to persist has two primary
sources. The first is the citizenry who are disillusioned with judicial systems
that promoted the agenda of the state and the party when doing so entailed
steam-rolling human rights and individual dignity. The second is their elected
representatives, many oriented toward democratic reform and bent on purging
from government those who promoted that legacy but who have taken refuge in
political or civil service appointments. As outspoken members of the legislative
arm, they do not shrink from focusing media attention on former party bosses
recast as social democrats and occasionally in high-level judicial positions.
Others publicly lambaste the institution of the judiciary for corruption on the part
of few. Launched from an institutional context, these attacks undermine what
should be an effective and productive working relationship between the two
branches, and they nourish public distrust in and contempt for the judiciary.
Judicial branch officials should strive to eliminate the remnants of this
legacy and take a more pro-active role in promoting good relations with their
66. For example, the Bulgarian Constitution provides in art. 117, section 3 for the judicial
branch to have an independent budget, a concept that is elaborated in the Judicial System Act in
the section entitled Judiciary's Budget, Amend. SG No. 74/2002 Art. 196, § 1 (2002), available at
http://www.legistlationonline.orgflegislation.php?tid= 112&lid=29 11 &less=false (last visited, Dec.
16, 2006). In Albania, in the summer of 1997, legislators were presented with a "Draft Law on the
Establishment of the Center of Administration of the Budget of the Judiciary for the Republic of
Albania." The Macedonian Judiciary recently formed an Independent Court Budget Committee.
In August 1998, two members of the committee, Professor Ljupco Arnaudovski, a member of the
Republic Judicial Council, and Justice Dragan Tumanivski of the Macedonian Supreme Court and
former high-level official in the Ministry of Justice, drafted a position paper entitled "Report on the
Independent Court Budget and the Financing of the Judiciary in the Republic of Macedonia" that
outlined the justification for and the benefits of transferring budgetary authority for the
Macedonian court system from the Ministry of Justice to the judicial branch. In Poland, at a
September 1999 conference sponsored by the National Judicial Council and attended by the
President of Poland, leaders of Parliament, and judicial branch officials, participants debated
competing proposals on the budgetary and administrative independence of the judiciary.
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counterparts in government and with the communities in which the courts
function. That effort might take the following directions:
(1) They can establish an office, under the supervision of the governing
body of the judiciary, responsible for maintaining positive and open relations
with the political branches and for promoting an understanding of the judiciary
and its needs. Significant benefits can accrue to the judiciary by maintaining a
strong professional relationship and coordinating closely with the legislative
branch on matters of importance to both branches. Examples include improving
(a) the operating efficiency of the judiciary to raise the level of confidence
international investors have in the rule of law and operation of the court system,
and (b) the overall quality and competence of judges in the judicial system to
promote greater confidence in the ability of the courts to dispense justice
according to the law. Once the appropriate legislative bodies have a better
understanding of the goals and objectives of the judiciary, how they relate to the
interests of the country, and the means for achieving them, they will be more
likely to provide the resources necessary for them.
(2) They can establish an office, under the supervision of the governing
body of the judiciary, responsible for publicizing the work of the judiciary and
the importance of the rule of law for a democratic society. Projects might
include pamphlets that explain how the courts function, how judges are
appointed, the rules of professional conduct to which judges are subject, and a
description of the process whereby complaints about judicial misconduct are
filed and processed. They might include court system newsletters distributed
free of charge and community outreach programs. Bar associations, law
faculties, and public-interest groups might organize, in conjunction with their
local courts, open forums in which charismatic judges participate as panelists on
discussions having to do with the rule of law, the role of law in society, and
related topics.
(3) They can establish in each region or division into which the judiciary is
organized a council of court presidents charged with investigating charges of
ethical and related violations of the oath of office brought against judges.
Charges against judicial officers should be reviewed thoroughly but promptly
through an internal review process. If the review process determines that the
charges are not frivolous, the council should ensure that they are investigated
and, where appropriate, that disciplinary action is taken. Creating the perception
in the mind of the public and the political branches that the judiciary is self-
policing will help to erode the negative institutional legacy of subordination and
dependence. It also will assuage the urgency with which elements in the
legislative branch are inclined to oversee and micro-manage the judiciary.
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F. Adequate Compensation for Judges
Inadequate compensation has potentially grave institutional consequences
that promote dependence and mediocrity. Judges are public officials charged
with understanding, interpreting, and applying the law in a manner that is open
to the legal profession and the public and subject to review. To do so in a
context free from external influence and internal bias, judges assume a
responsibility whose comparative difficulty vis-a-vis that of other public office
ranks high and should be compensated accordingly to attract high caliber
candidates with unquestionable integrity. Removing critical elements of this
responsibility, such as independence and freedom from external influence, as
was routine under previous regimes, diminishes its significance and the level at
which adjudication should be compensated. Although those elements have been
reintegrated into the function of judging in the emerging democracies,
commensurate enhancement of compensation has not followed.
The level at which the legislative branch sets judicial salaries reflects the
importance it attributes to the responsibility of judging. Although those salary
levels do not approximate those of successful, senior-level practitioners, the ideal
is to set them at levels that suffice, when linked with the prestige of the position
and the opportunity to provide an important public service, to draw the interest
and commitment of bright and competent law graduates. In many of these
countries, legislative policy sets judicial salaries at levels that do not approach
this ideal. Because the position's prestige is in slow recovery from the legacy
outlined above, the social status of judicial service falls below that of younger
and relatively inexperienced private practitioners. The public perception of
government-based adjudication still reduces to a necessary evil in which efforts
to achieve justice essentially pit the individual against the state with
correspondingly low odds. The problem perpetuates itself because without
higher salaries to compensate for the profession's low public perception and to
attract capable and career-oriented applicants, the image does not change. The
outcomes of this general judicial salary policy are several:
(1) Most who aspire to prestigious positions look elsewhere than the
judiciary for fulfilling and rewarding professional opportunities.
(2) Most who aspire to public service positions look elsewhere in the
government than the judiciary for self-fulfilling and rewarding careers.
(3) Many who do opt for the profession of judging, after a few years of
service, use their experience as a springboard to launch their careers as
private practitioners or notaries where they earn substantially more
under better working conditions.
(4) Those who remain generally fall into one of two categories: those who
are competent and dedicated public servants for whom judging is the
career of choice, regardless of the money, prestige, or public perception;
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and those who are marginally competent and for whom the option of
moving successfully into private practice is not a promising prospect.
The institutional consequences of inadequate compensation are debilitating
and do little to promote a positive perception of the judiciary as a vibrant, pro-
active, and self-assured arm of the government:
(1) The best and brightest are promoted into positions of management where
demands on their time are dominated by administrative functions that
should and easily could be delegated to professional managers with the
results that (a) the courts would be more efficiently administered and (b)
judges could concentrate on the primary business of the courts.
(2) The best and brightest are responsible for preparing, training, and
overseeing the constant influx of newly appointed judges, an ongoing
and time-consuming function that diverts their talents and energy from
the business of adjudicating cases.
(3) Prospects for improving the judiciary are undermined as judges, once
equipped with a few years experience and training, leave for greener
pastures. Entry into the judicial profession is viewed as an
apprenticeship in preparation for the more lucrative legal profession, the
costs of which are born by the judiciary and by the taxpayer. Those
costs are substantial, both in tax revenues and in the judiciary's ability to
forge a core of experienced and competent judges.
(4) The disproportionately large corps of new judges hearing cases for
which they are not prepared results in large numbers of appeals, a high
percentage of which are reversed. These appeals clog the second-
instance courts with cases that should have been disposed of in trial
courts. The consequence is that the judiciary is burdened with
unnecessary repetitive work-a burden that precludes judges from
attending to and focusing their energy on significant appeals that deserve
more attention.
(5) An important issue is the extent to which failure to fairly compensate
judges inadvertently promotes corruption. Otherwise honest and
dependable individuals who, after completing an arduous course of study
and legal apprenticeship, then being appointed to positions of substantial
authority and responsibility, may have a greater propensity than their
more fairly compensated colleagues in the West to succumb to proffers
of gifts and bribes by unscrupulous attorneys or wealthy litigants simply
in order to supplement their meager incomes.
There is no guarantee that increasing judicial salaries would stem this loss
of new judges and eliminate corruption, but indicators suggest it would. As
[Vol. 14:1
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
judicial salaries become more competitive, the exodus is likely to slow. There
would be other positive consequences. For example, over time, applicant quality
for judicial appointments would increase as would the prestige of the profession.
The prospect of achieving an independent judiciary is daunting, particularly
for fledgling democracies that have emerged from but remain mired in the
tradition and collective social memory of an institution of the government that
exploited the judicial function and manipulated it to serve the interests of the
state. The judiciaries of East and Central Europe and those of the new
independent states are burdened by this institutional legacy whose remnants are
deep seated and difficult to transcend. But there is cause for hope. In each of
these judiciaries, there are men and women of courage, vision, energy, and
leadership who are affecting serious and lasting institutional reforms in the
judiciaries of their respective countries. Slowly but inexorably, they are
organizing their colleagues into vibrant and pro-active judges' associations that
are undertaking sustained campaigns for individual and institutional
independence. There is much at stake and there are strong elements, even within
the respective judiciaries, that fail to descry this vision and prefer to cling to the
past. But the forces of change and prospects for reform are gaining momentum,
and in bits and pieces, these judicial systems are progressing toward institutional
independence.
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